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Introduction 
With high-intensity radiation sources, when the walls serving for 
radiation shielding simultaneously perform the function of structural elements 
of the building housing the source, e.g. with ion or electron accelerators and 
nuclear reactors, the thickness of the walls is defined primarily by the required 
radiation shielding and not by statical aspects, since from the construction view 
thinner walls would usually do as well. 
It is preferable to test the serviceability of such walls with respect to 
radiation shielding before the installation of the source, since the reinforcement 
of shielding, if found necessary after the installation of the accelerator or 
nuclear reactor, will be inconvenient and costly. On the other hand, in thick (60 
to 120 cm) concrete walls the probability of the formation of cavities and of 
non-uniform density distribution will be higher, and these factors largely 
impair the radiation-shielding characteristics of the wall. 
For such tests, inspection with gamma rays is in general use. However, 
with increasing wall thicknesses, higher energies and intensities of the radiation 
will be required. We therefore studied the serviceability of a transportable 
betatron providing 6 MeV X-ray radiation for testing the gamma ray 
attenuation power of concrete walls with thicknesses exceeding 60 cm. In the 
experiments discussed in the followings we studied the detectability of defects 
(cavities) in concrete for various wall thicknesses and for the case of the cavities 
being located at various depths within the wall. 
The betatron 
For our tests we used a Soviet-make portable betatron for industrial 
purposes (type PMB-6). 
In betatrons, radiation is generated similarly as in X-ray tubes, with the 
main difference that the acceleration of the electrons occurs on a circular orbit 
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instead of a straight path [1,2,3,4]. The further difference is in the energy of the 
radiation. While in X-ray tubes the maximum energy of the electrons is in the 
order of 100 keY, it is 6 MeV in the above-mentioned betatron type.·For this 
reason, the term "gamma" radiation is frequently used instead of X-ray 
radiation when speaking of betatrons. 
The energy of the emitted X-rays has a continuous distribution 
downward from the set value, its average being around 40 to 50;6 of the 
maximum. According to the instrument manual the maximum dose rate at a 
distance of 1 m from the anticathode is 0.18 Gy /h (18 R/h) for the betatron 
type PMB-6. The uniformity of the beam is guaranteed within a 9° semiangle 
cone. 
To characterize the strength of the radiation source more apprehensibly, 
let us note that the dose rate 0.18 Gy/h is equivalent to the dose rate of a 60Co 
source having an activity of 0.55 TBq (15 Ci) or of a 137CS source having an 
activity of 2.96 TBq (80 Ci) [5]. 
The attenuation of the gamma radiation 
The intensity I of the parallel, monoenergetic beam entering the infinite 
semispace in the direction + x changes, owing to the Compton scattering, the 
photoeffect and the pair generation [6, 7]: 
dl= -fll dx (1) 
where fl is the linear attenuation coefficient. The solution of this equation, if the 
intensity is 10 at x = 0, is 
l(x) = 10 exp ( - flX) (2) 
where l(x) is the intensity behind x cm of the material. 
The linear attenuation coefficient fl (cm - 1) is proportional to the density p 
of the shielding material. In practice, the mass attenuation coefficient flm is 
more frequently in use: 
flm = fl/ P (3) 
The value of flm depends only on the average atomic number of the material. It 
can be found vs. gamma radiation energy in the literature [8]. By introducing 
flm' Eq. (2) will assume the form 
l(x) = 10 exp ( - flmPX) . (4) 
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In realistic conditions the gamma (X-ray) photons reaching the detector 
(the human organism to be protected) by multiple scattering on the shield must 
also be taken into account. The theoretical discussion of this process is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. One general method will be briefly mentioned 
only: the introduction of the buildup factor B [9, 10]. It means that the factual 
value of I is larger by a factor B than the value obtained by assuming strict 
parallelism of the beam: 
(5) 
The value of B is usually approached by the Taylor relationship [8]: 
(6) 
The coefficients in Formula (6) vs. gamma energy are listed in the literature [9]. 
For practical purposes any quantity related to the intensity I can be 
introduced instead of I into the above relationships. They can hence be 
interpreted in terms of dose rates too. 
Owing to the exponential law of gamma or X-ray attenuation, any small 
change in p will lead to a substantial change in I(x), and therefore the method is 
suitable for the detection and determination of material faults. 
The values used in practice for characterizing radiation shields are half-
value layer thickness 
(7) 
and tenth-value layer thickness 
(8) 
Testing conditions 
For modelling the shielding walls we used 70 cm by 70 cm by 10 cm 
concrete slabs manufactured for this purpose by the Department for 
Reinforced Concrete Structures of the Technical University Budapest. In the 
centres of two slabs, material defects were formed intentionally in the course of 
manufacture: cavities of about 200 and 500 cm3 , resp., filled with polystyrene 
foam. The cavities were cylindric in shape, their height was 10 cm, their 
diameter 5 and 8 cm, resp. The wall thickness was changed by varying the 
number of slabs placed between the radiation source and the detector. The 
distance between the source and the detector was constant (110 cm) in all tests. 
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The radiation source was the betatron already discussed in the above. Its 
energy was set to 6 MeV. 
The detecting devices used were GDR-make portable dose ratemeters 
type VA-J-1SA operating with ionization chambers. Their measuring range is 
10- 1 .uGy/h to 3 Gy /h. 
For comparison, we also performed measurements with an ND-130 type 
detector. This is fitted with a 31 mm diam. NaI(Tl) scintillation crystal and 
attached to an NK-3S0 type instrument used as scaler. The data yielded by 
both detecting devices were completely similar in their trend. The results listed 
in the followings are the data obtained with the detector type V A-J. 
Since the intensity ofthe radiation emitted by the betatron is not constant 
in time (owing to changes in the magnetic field, heating-up of the target etc.), we 
utilized a monitoring detector (type VA-J-1S). 
To approach what is termed "ideal measuring geometry", we mounted the 
betatron, the shielding slabs and the detector at a height of about 1 m above the 
floor at a distance of 3 m from the shielding walls surrounding the test site, in 
order to minimize the effect of environmental reflection, and on the other hand, 
we equipped the ionization chamber with lead shielding 10 cm thick, 
containing a collimator hole 3 cm diam. in the centre, to reduce the interfering 
effect of the buildup factor. 
The testing equipment was established in the building of the Training 
Reactor of the Technical University Budapest. The tests were carried out in the 
periods only when the nuclear reactor was not in operation. The background 
radiation was then around 1 .uGy/h. 
Experimental results 
"N on-defective" concrete walls 
The wall thickness desired for the test in question was formed by placing 
the required number of slabs between the betatron and the detector. The axis of 
the beam emitted by the betatron was perpendicular to the wall plane and 
directed towards its centre. On the opposite side of the wall, the detector was 
moved horizontally along the line L in the medium plane, and measurements 
were taken at distances of S cm each. The results are presented in Figs 1 and 2 
(curves A and C). 
"Defective" concrete walls 
We tested four different defective walls: wall thickness 60 and 80 cm, resp., 
with one element in each wall containing a '" SOO cm3 cavity, and wall thickness 
70 and 90 cm, resp., with one element containing a '" 200 cm3 cavity. Figs 1 and 
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2, curves Band D demonstrate the cases when the defective element was the 
central slab in the wall and the axis radiation beam--detector passed through 
the medium height of the cavity. 
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Fig. 1. Dose rates passing through the tested walls A - Non-defective wall, 60 cm thick; B - defective wall. 
60 cm thick (500 cm3 cavity); C - non-defective wall, 80 cm thick; D - defective wall, 80 cm thick (500 cm3 
cavity) 
It is obvious from the figures how much worse the protective power of the 
defective wall is as compared to the non-defective wall. For the larger cavity the 
dose rate permeation is higher by a factor of '" 2.4, for the smaller cavity by a 
factor of '" 1.5 as compared to the non-defective wall. 
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We also performed tests with walls in which the defective element formed 
the wall surface turned towards the radiation source and the detector, resp. The 
results demonstrated that permeation is higher when the defect is closer to the 
radiation source (by about 7% for the 60 cm wall and 11 % for the 90 cm wall as 
compared to the reverse arrangement). This phenomenon can be explained by 
simple geometrical considerations: it is due to the spreading of the beam. 
en 
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Fig. 2. Dose Rates passing through the tested walls A - Non-defective wall. 70 cm thick; B - defective wall! 
70 cm thick (200 cm3 cavity); C - non-defective wall. 90 cm thick; D defective wall. 80 cm thick (200 cm' 
cavity) 
In practice, it will be impossible to adjust the beam and the detector in the 
manner that their axis pass exactly through the centre of the defect, since its 
location is unknown, the objective of the test being precisely to find it. For this 
reason, we also performed measurements with the betatron displaced 
horizontally compared to the axis of the cavity. The defect's known position 
was considered the zero point of the system in which the axes of the detector 
and the radiation source were displaced in the positive and negative direction, 
along the lines Land W, resp. 
The results measured with the 70 cm wall containing a 200 cm3 cavity are 
presented in Fig. 3. The figure clearly demonstrates that the method is suitable 
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Fig, 3, Intensity curves taken at different positions of the betatron, for a 70 cm concrete wall containing a 200 
cm3 defect; 1 - betatron at Hi = -10; 2 betatron at Hi =0: 3 - betatron at Hi = + 10 cm 
Summary 
The tests discussed in the above were only model tests. None the less, one 
may conclude that the betatron is suitable to locate defects in thickner concrete 
walls. The following remarks should, however, be taken into consideration: 
The thickest wall tested was 90 cm, owing to the limned number of 
concrete slabs at disposal. The thickness could, however, be increased further, 
considering that the dose rate that passed through the non-defective 90 cm wall 
was 33 f1Gy /h. Even if calculating with a background radiation value of 1 
f1Gy/h, more than one tenth-value layer thickness could still be added, 
corresponding to 29.5 cm on the basis of the values measured. That is, the test 
method can be applied to walls as thick as 120 to 130 cm, from concrete with a 
density value of 2250 kg/m 3 . 
- The estimation of the sensitivity of the method, that is, of the size of the 
defect that can still be detected, is a complex task, since it depends on wall 
thickness, sensitivity of the detector etc. We made tests with only two cavity 
sizes (500 and 200 cm3) which were at our disposal. What we could therefore 
ascertain was that a 200 cm3 cavity can readily be detected in a 90 cm wall (cf. 
curves C and D in Fig. 2). One may, however, assume that this is not the 
sensitivity limit yet in walls of this thickness, considering that for L = 0 and W 
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=0, the ratio between the radiation passing through the defective wall (52 
,uGyjh) and the non-defective wall (34 ,uGyjh) was 1.48, and a smaller ratio (1.1 
to 1.2) could still be reliably measured at lower background radiation and using 
a more sensitive detector. F or thinner walls the sensitivity, that is, the volume of 
the detectable defect would presumably be still smaller. 
- One basis to go by for locating the defect is the finding that the 
radiation passing through the wall is affected by the position of the defect 
relatively to the source: it is highest when the defect is on the side of the wall 
close to the radiation source. 
- From Fig. 3 one may conclude that by means of several measurements, 
the shape of the intensity curve will allow to locate the defect with satisfactory 
accuracy, provided that the distance between the axis of the beam and the axis 
of the cavity does not exceed 20 to 30 cm, this value, however, depending on 
wall thickness too. 
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